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In the presence of an optimally designed unemployment bene￿t system we show
that it is optimal for the government to encourage human capital acquisition. The
driving force of this result is the complementarity between human capital and labor-
market-oriented behavior. If policy includes inter-temporal transfers, the optimal
level of investment in human capital is given at the point where, at the margin,
expected return to human capital is identical to the risk free rate even though there
is no full insurance at the optimum. Keywords: Unemployment Insurance; Edu-
cational Policy, JEL classi￿cation: J65, I28.
Resumo
Na presen￿a de um sistema de seguro desemprego otimamente desenhado, mostramos
que Ø sempre ￿timo para o governo incentivar a aquisi￿ªo de capital humano. O resul-
tado Ø gerado pela complementariedade entre o capital humano e o comportamento
em rela￿ªo ao mercado de trabalho. Se as pol￿ticas pœblicas tambØm envolvem trans-
ferŒncias inter-temporais, o n￿vel de capital humano ￿timo Ø dado no ponto em que
seu retorno Ø igualado ao do ativo livre de risco. Isto apesar de, no ￿timo, nªo se
ter seguro total. Palavras-chave: Seguro-desemprego, Pol￿tica Educacional
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Economists have long recognized the existence of a link between unemployment spells
and human capital. On the one hand, unemployment episodes are associated with lower
returns to schooling￿ at the limit, zero returns, if either agents do not take informal
jobs while unemployed or if these jobs do not bene￿t from education. On the other,
there is substantial evidence that, the more educated a person is, for the less extent she
is unemployed.1
Actual policies also seem to take into account the relationship between unemployment
and human capital investment decisions. Governments that have large unemployment
insurance ￿ henceforth, UI ￿ programs are also those that have most signi￿cant par-
ticipation in the funding of higher education.
It is apparent from the arguments that optimal unemployment insurance and educa-
tional policies may have important interactions. However, it is not clear how the facts
cited in the ￿rst paragraph would lead to the policies cited in the second, since the two
pieces of evidence o⁄ered in the ￿rst paragraph may indicate an ambiguous relationship
between returns to schooling and overall unemployment risk. Fear of unemployment may
lead to an over or under-investment in human capital depending on how education a⁄ects
job opportunities. Moreover, once one incorporates the fact that unemployment is not
independent of agents￿behavior, one should be suspicious that higher education may not
causes a decrease in unemployment but rather the fact that other actions that reduce the
probability of one remaining unemployed may be in￿ uenced by education creates endo-
geneity problems that drive the observed negative relationship between unemployment
and the level of education.
To the best of our knowledge, Brown and Kaufold (1988) were the ￿rst to explore
the relationship between human capital formation and unemployment insurance pro-
grams. They show that the presence of an unemployment insurance program may lead
to increased investment in human capital by decreasing the human capital risk. Though
this may have important consequences in guaranteeing that at least a small amount of
unemployment insurance is likely to increase welfare, this says very little about how
government should (of if it should) intervene in educational choices when a UI program
is present.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the interaction between educational and
unemployment governmental policies emphasizing whether government should induce
agents to get more or less education than they would privately choose.2
1See, for example, Nickell and Bell (1997). Note however that this evidence is not present in countries
where there is no unemployment bene￿t systems. We shall discuss this aspect of the evidence later.
2We perceive our model as belonging to broader literature that deals with the e⁄ect of uncertainty
on human capital policies: Eaton and Rosen (1980), Hamilton (1987), Andersson and Anderberg (2003),
da Costa and Maestri (2004).
2We maintain the simple two period structure of Brown and Kaufold￿ s (1988) model,
as well as their inclusion of an informal sector. Contrary to them, we emphasize the
importance of incentives e⁄ects of unemployment insurance in determining the fraction
of an agent￿ s productive life that she is unemployed. One of the nice things about
incorporating this possibility is that it generates, as we shall see, a complementarity
between education and search e⁄ort that endogenously produces the negative correlation
between education and unemployment which empirical evidence we have referred to
before. It also makes the encouragement of human capital formation an important ally
for the UI program.
Our main ￿nding is that it is always optimal for the government to encourage agents
to obtain education than they would privately do. We show that education is to be
encouraged, not because agents under or over-invest in it as one might be lead to believe
from the our previous discussion of Brown and Kaufold (1988), but exactly because the
complementarity of search e⁄ort and human capital signals a ￿ good￿labor market atti-
tude and helps separating ￿ unlucky￿agents from those who just do not put enough e⁄ort
in participating in formal markets. By emphasizing the complementarity between gov-
ernment policies and UI programs, our model may indicate one reason for the correlation
between expenditures in UI programs and in public education. Indeed, the governments
that decide to provide larger insurance networks may face more often individuals who
claim that they do not ￿nd jobs when in fact they are not spending e⁄ort on the search for
employment. Hence, it is possible to alleviate this problem by increasing the opportunity
cost of the unemployment spell through the provision of more education.
Another important aspect of our paper is that we follow Brown and Kaufold (1988) in
allowing for an informal sector where agents can be sheltered from taxes while bene￿ting
from unemployment insurance or, earlier in life, where they can use the time not engaged
in increasing their human capital. We show that our results are robust to the existence
of an informal sector, not dependent on it.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economy
and discusses agent￿ s choices absent government policies. Section 3 derives the optimal
policies in a world where savings are controlled by the government. In section 4 we discuss
the role of non-observed savings that arises when the government tries to implement the
second-best inter-temporal transfers. This possibility is accompanied by some technical
issues which are handled through a series of results that we present in the appendix.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economy
We model a two period economy with an atom of identical agents. The two pe-
riod assumption￿ also adopted by Acemoglu and Shimer (2001), Brown and Kaufold
(1988) and Bailey (1978), to name a few￿ is mainly due to our emphasis in the interac-
3tion between education and unemployment. Educational choices are usually long term
choices￿ as compared to the length of unemployment spells￿ and mostly done early in
life. They a⁄ect later choices regarding work since they change relative payo⁄ of em-
ployment vis ￿ vis unemployment, as emphasized by Brown and Kaufold (1988).
As for considering identical agents, Bailey (1978) has pointed out that non-observed
heterogeneity and the possibility of self-selection issues may be the very reason for the
non-existence of private unemployment insurance in the ￿rst place. Moreover, the fact
that agents are identical means that we disregard the possible interactions between redis-
tributive and insurance motives in government￿ s policy design. We do not do it for sake
of realism but rather for simplicity. As in Bailey (1978), we remove heterogeneity to focus
on some speci￿c issues related to the incentive e⁄ects associated to the unemployment
insurance program.
In the next few pages we spell out our model.
Preferences Agents are expected utility maximizers with temporary utility given by
u(c)￿￿
￿￿ L ￿ l
￿
; where c is consumption, l is leisure and ￿ L is the agent￿ s time endowment.
We assume that both functions are smooth with u0; ￿0; ￿00 > 0 and u00 < 0 and satisfy
the usual Inada conditions.
There is another dimension of e⁄ort, not included in the description of temporary
utility which is related to the struggle to remain in the legal markets. The fraction of time
of an agent￿ s life she spends unemployed is a function of both the probability of her losing
a job when employed and the probability that she gets a new job when unemployed.3
This other dimension of e⁄ort aims at capturing both aspects with a single parameter
p 2 [0;1] that we associate to an agent￿ s attitude toward work: be it her capacity of
working in some unpleasant environments or the time she spends in searching for new
jobs. We take this to be a life-long choice made very early on an agents professional life.4
Therefore, we write an agents￿ s expected utility as
u(c) ￿ ￿





￿￿ L ￿ l
￿￿
￿ ’(p); (1)
The choice of p as a parameter de￿ned in the interval [0;1] is not accidental. We shall
associate p to the probability that an agent is employed in any moment of her ￿ adult￿life.
This being the case, the expectation operator in (1) is with regards to the probability, p.
Technology The economy has two sectors: a formal sector and an informal sector.
Each sector produces goods with a linear technology that transforms one e¢ ciency unit
3Equivalently, we could de￿ne it as a function of the length of her job tenures and unemployment
spells.
4There is strong evidence that this ￿ labor oriented attitude￿is of great importance in de￿ning labor
market outcome. There is, however, some evidence that policies aimed at changing this attitued may be
quite helpful, even at later stages of the working life. We shall neglet this dimension of policy.
4of labor into one unit of output. We abuse notation slightly by using Y to represent
both, and normalize units in such a way that, in the ￿rst period of the agent￿ s life, one
hour of her time provides one e¢ ciency unit of labor. In the second period, however,
an agent￿ s productivity will depend on whether she has acquired human capital and on
whether she is working in the formal or informal sector.
Modelling an informal sector adds an important component of most development
economies. Hence, when individuals cannot ￿nd any formal job they have access to
a (less productive) informal sector job, in which case the income they produce is not
observable by the government.
More speci￿cally, in the informal sector one unit of time generates one e¢ ciency unit
Y = L = ￿ L￿l; where L is working time, regardless of how educated the agent is. As for
the formal sector we have Y = w(h)L where h is an agent￿ s human capital. We assume
w(0) ￿ 1 and w0 > 0;w00 < 0: The fact that the productivity of labor is higher in the
formal sector is not controversial, and, absent this, a formal sector would not exist.
The other two assumption, on the other hand are directly related to the role of educa-
tion on agents￿labor market choices. The ￿rst assumption, as mentioned before, means
that an agent is (weakly) more productive in the formal sector for all levels of human
capital. The other assumptions guarantee that human capital increases productivity, at
decreasing rates.
To acquire human capital an agent must dedicate some of her time at youth to
studying, therefore sacri￿cing her leisure and/or her ￿rst period income. This means
that, in the ￿rst period, and absent government intervention, c = Y = ￿ L￿l￿h: Notice
that we take foregone earnings to be the only cost of education.
Agents￿choices Absent government￿ s interventions the agent￿ s problem is
max
p;Y;h
fu(Y ￿ s) ￿ ￿ (h + Y ) + pV e(h;s) + (1 ￿ p)V u(s) ￿ ’(p)g
where
V u (s) = max
Y u fu(Y u + s) ￿ ￿ (Y u)g
and
V e(h;s) = max
Y e
￿





Here, the problem of the agent need not be convex, in virtue of the interplay between
p and h: However, provided that the solution is interior, the ￿rst order conditions,
u0 (Y ￿ s) = ￿0 (h + Y );
￿0 (h + Y ) = pV e0 (h;s)
and
V e(h;s) ￿ V u(s) = ’0(p):
5are necessary for the optimum of the agent￿ s problem.
Naturally, for there to be any investment in human capital formation it must be the
case that ￿0 (Y ) ￿ pV e
h (0;s) ￿ 0: We shall assume this to be the case, since the other
possibility is rather uninteresting.
We have not added a condition for the optimal choice of savings. In fact we have not
even addressed the issue of inter-temporal transfer of income. We allow the government to
control the agent￿ s savings which is what most of the literature that introduces dynamic
features in agency problem does. Thus, education, h, is the only form of inter-temporal
transfers.
3 Optimal Policy
Notice that, even under the assumption that the solution is interior (which is restric-
tive but not overwhelmingly so) one cannot rely on the ￿rst order approach in the case
where all these variables are beyond government￿ s control. However, this non-convexity
will be of no consequence since we shall be assuming that the government directly con-
trols the agent￿ s educational choice, h, and savings￿ which we take to be 0 without loss
in generality.5
With regards to the assumption that the government controls savings, there are two
sides of it. First, it may very well be the case that savings take the form of contracts
or purchases of real assets for which observability is possible. This seems to be the
underlying assumption adopted in most of the literature. Second, in the case discussed
in the present section, at least with regards to savings, there is a good reason for believing
that the possible non-observability of savings will not constrain the government￿ s policy.
If credit markets are not well developed, and if one takes into account the fact that the
bulk of one￿ s income comes later in life, the restriction that s ￿ 0 should bind.6 This
being the case we should not expect savings choice to destroy convexity over the relevant
range of the main variables. We shall come back to this last possibility later on.
It is still the case that the government cannot observe the amount of work the agent
supplies in the hidden economy, both when young, Y and when adult, Y u: But since
the government controls h (and savings play no role) the problem of the agent is convex
in the remaining choice variables, which means that the ￿rst order approach may be
applied. Moreover, we assume that government can make a transfer ￿ to the ￿rst-period
5Notice that we are concerned with savings from youth, which is when educational choices are made,
to adulthood. This is di⁄erent from the issue of how savings made by one who is already a participant
in the legal job market a⁄ect the design of unemployment insurance policies (e.g., Werning (2001),
Kocherlakota (2004).)
6This statement is precise in the case where we associate the life-cycle model to its certainty equiva-
lence speci￿cation. If precautionary savings is important, however, it may not be optimal to bring future
income to the present even if expected earnings are higher than current earnings.
6of each agent life.











+ (1 ￿ p)V u (!) ￿ ’(p)
￿
; (2)
where V (h;￿) ￿ maxY fu(Y;￿) ￿ ￿ (h + Y )g; and V u (!) ￿ maxY u fu(Y u + !) ￿ ￿ (Y u)g;
subject to the resource constraint,
p(Y e ￿ ye) ￿ (1 ￿ p)! + ￿ [ ￿ ]






￿ V u (!) = ’0 (p): [ ￿ ]
Since our main concern here is the educational policy, we di⁄erentiate the associated







w(h)2w0(h) = ￿0 (h + Y ): (3)
Assume, for now that the solution to the agent￿ s optimization problem is interior (the
corner solution h = 0 is obvious). Then, absent government￿ s intervention, her optimal







w(h)2w0(h) = ￿0 (h + Y )
which means that the agent would under-invest in education, when compared to the
second-best level chosen by the government.
Or, putting in a di⁄erent perspective, the government should distort the agent￿ s
choice as one can see by the wedge between private marginal costs and private marginal
bene￿ts of education presented in (3). The result obtains despite the fact that the agent
is not able to smooth consumption across time by (dis)saving. The result is formally
stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 At the optimum human capital, h, is set above what an agent would
privately choose.
This result arises from the fact that o⁄ering UI has a perverse incentive e⁄ect: people
decide to exert less e⁄ort to remain in the legal market. In order to alleviate the moral
hazard problem it is optimal for the government to encourage human capital formation.
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to ye and h can be manipulated to obtain the







7where the private bene￿t of education appears in the right hand side, with the state-price
de￿ ator adjusting for the risk involved in human capital investment.
Were the more hazard problem not present in this setting and we would have full
insurance and the optimal level of human capital would be found by equalizing its ex-
pected return to that of the risk free asset. We shall call this simply the ￿ socially e¢ cient￿
level recognizing, however, that the level of labor supply and the probability at which
the expected return is measured need not coincide with the ￿rst best levels. What we
try to ￿gure out next is how the prescription for the optimal level of education found in
this second best world compare with the socially e¢ cient one.
From (4) one may not tell whether the level of investment is e¢ cient. On the one
hand, agents adjust the return to risk as captured by the state price de￿ ator in (4),
while on the other, the left hand side is less than one, while e¢ ciency occurs when







This is where the assumption on the possibility of inter-temporal transfers, as repre-
sented by ￿; become important. Taking the derivative of the government problem with







Hence, we are able to o⁄er the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Investment in human capital is driven to the socially e¢ cient level.
Thus, in spite of the fact that agents choose a higher educational choice than the one
they would choose without government intervention, the human capital level is driven
to an e¢ cient level. It is essential for this result the assumption that government has
full control over savings. In this case, it is possible to o⁄er incentives for people in the
second period by increasing their second period income while employed, it can be done
either by increasing their productivity or by o⁄ering a monetary transfer, hence the cost
of opportunity of both policies should be the same.
In passing, it is also worth mentioning the fact that the marginal tax on labor income
is zero. This is immediate from the ￿rst order conditions with respect to ye and Y e,
respectively,








As we shall see in section 4, this result does not hold if savings are not controlled by
the government.
83.1 Discussions and a Caveat
The inclusion of an informal market as part of the description of the economy may
lead one to wonder how important this is for the results we obtain ￿ and, consequently,
how relevant this may be for developed economies. The answer is that results remain
valid with the exclusion of the informal sector.











+ (1 ￿ p)[u(!) ￿ ￿ (0)] ￿ ’(p)
￿
;
subject to the appropriately modi￿ed constraints, the exact same expressions, (3) and
(4), are found.
Hence the result is not dependent on the existence of an informal market but is robust
to it.
An important caveat for our main result, however, concerns the inter-temporal trans-
fers. When arguing that the assumption that the government controls savings is not a
very restrictive one, we used the fact that credit markets may not be generous enough to
allow for negative savings when such long horizons are considered. With inter-temporal
transfers the optimal policy involves
u0 (Y + ￿) < pu0 (ye) + (1 ￿ p)u0 (Y u + !):
This is nothing but a restatement of Rogerson￿ s (1985) result, and is easily derived in
our model by combining the ￿rst order conditions with respect to ￿; ! and ye.7
The consequence of means that the non-negativity restriction on savings ceases to be
important an non-observability can have important consequence for policy design.
There are two ways out of this di¢ culty. First we may argue that non-observability
is not important so that, in practice, the government controls savings and all our results
remain valid.
The second possibility is that non-observability is important and optimal policies
should take this into account. The problem with this reaction is that without observ-
ability the problem that the agent solves is not convex, which means that the ￿rst order
condition need not characterize the optimal choice of the agent. In the next section
we have deal with this issue by discretizing the choice set and show that, even though
hidden savings do alter other dimensions of policy ￿ e.g., the marginal tax rate for labor
income ￿ , it is still the case that education should be encouraged.
7To be precise,
u










e) + (1 ￿ p)u
0 (Y
u + !);
where the term in brackets is negative since y
e > Y
u+!: This expression emphasizes the incentive role of
distorting inter-temporal choices. However, the ￿rst order conditions may also be manipulated to obtain
the inverse Euler equation of Rogerson (1985).
94 Hidden Savings
Hidden savings are important for the design of unemployment insurance programs
because they a⁄ect the costs of being unemployed and, thus the incentives to look for a
new job. There is a growing literature dealing with the e⁄ects of hidden savings on the
design of unemployment insurance programs.8 Our two period model does not allow us
to discuss the way in which savings a⁄ect the pattern of transfers along an unemployment
spells. We share with the literature, however the concern with how incentives are a⁄ected
by savings choices and how this feeds back into taxes and, ultimately, on human capital
formation.
Because our model collapses an agent￿ s entire adult live in a single period, one may
wonder whether allowing for savings would completely destroy the problem and make the
discussion of an unemployment insurance program uninteresting. In fact, it may. Levine
and Zame (2002) have shown that with in￿nite lives, purely idiosyncratic shocks the
equilibrium allocation of an economy with unrestricted savings can be made arbitrarily
close to the allocation with complete markets by making the discount rate su¢ ciently
close to one. However, in an economy with ￿nite lives and empirically sound discount
rates, unemployment does matter even when precautionary savings are used to improve
consumption smoothing. Without full insurance and with ￿nite lives, consumption is
history dependent and consumption is decreasing in the [expected amount of time] that
one is unemployed.9
We ￿rst de￿ne the indirect utility functions,
V u (s;!) ￿ max
Y u fu(Y u + ! + s) ￿ ￿ (Y u)g:
and,
V (s;k;h) ￿ max
Y
u(Y ￿ s + k) ￿ ￿ (Y + h);
conditional on an agent being unemployed and employed, respectively.
The government￿ s program is
max
￿
V (s;k;h) + p
￿





+ (1 ￿ p)V u (Y;s;!) ￿ ’(p)
￿
(5)
subject to the resource constraint
p(Y e ￿ ye) ￿ (1 ￿ p)! + k (6)
8E.g., Kocherlakota (2004), Werning (2002), Abrahan and Pavoni (2003).
9With multiple periods, the point in time one is unemployed is also important. It may very well be
the case that, at a given moment, an agent consumes more than another agent who have experienced
more goods shocks. However, at any moment conditional on the current level of wealth the monotonicity
is guaranteed.
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Non-observation of both savings and non-markets skills render the agent￿ s problem
potentially non-convex, and makes the use of a ￿rst order approach unreliable.
There are some alternatives for dealing with the issue. Werning (2002) restricts
preferences to a class where the ￿rst order approach is guaranteed to work. Abraham and
Pavoni (2003) solve the model assuming that the approach works and then check whether,
for the speci￿c parametrization they have chosen, the ￿rst order conditions characterize
a maximum at the optimal solution. In both cases, the models are substantially more
complex than ours since these authors work with fully dynamic problems that demand
the transformation of the problem into a recursive one. Our payo⁄ is that we are able
to adopt a di⁄erent procedure that does not depend on a speci￿c functional form of
parametrization of the problem.
That is, we pursue a di⁄erent path more suited to the problem we face. We discretize
the e⁄ort space by making the domain of p to be the ￿nite set f0;p1;::;1g and proceed
by analyzing the optimal strategies of deviation. This procedure, in some sense, mimics
a numerical approach with an important advantage: all results derived herein do not
depend on speci￿c functional forms.




V (^ s;k;h) + p
￿





+ (1 ￿ p)V u (^ s;!) ￿ ’(^ p)
￿
: (8)
which optimal value we shall denote W (k;h;ye;Y e;!;p): The restriction that ^ s 2 R+
is due to the credit constraint.
Next, we de￿ne for the government a relaxed program as




￿(p)[W (k;h;ye;Y e;!; ^ p) ￿ W (k;h;ye;Y e;!;p)] (9)
where instead of considering the complete set of incentive compatibility constraints, we
only consider those that guarantee that the agent does not choose a lower level of e⁄ort
than the optimum, p￿:
Because the government faces fewer constraints, the solution to (9) is not inferior to
the solution to the government￿ s problem (5) when constraint (7) is considered. What
we show in the appendix is that if (k￿;h￿;y￿
e;Y ￿
e ;!￿;p￿) solves (9) then, at this solution,
there is no strategy with p > ^ p (and associated optimal choices) that yields higher
expected utility for the agent. Therefore the solution to (9) solves government￿ s problem
(5) subject to (6) and (7). This proposition shows that after solving the relaxed problem
11no strategy associated to a higher e⁄ort can yield a better payo⁄. Intuitively, when
the government designs the optimal mechanism, it can neglect the possibility of agents
spending too much e⁄ort to search for a job.
The next two lemmas, proven in the appendix, are stated here to facilitate the intu-
ition regarding some of the results that follow.
Lemma 1 In all strategies that contemplate a lower level of e⁄ort than the optimum
the agent chooses no more savings than she chooses when she makes the socially optimal
e⁄ort.
Lemma 2 In all strategies that contemplate a lower level of e⁄ort the agent chooses at
least the same labor supply in the ￿rst period.
To grasp the logic behind these results, one should recall that savings are comple-
mentary with deviant behavior (lower than optimal e⁄ort, p), since agents who do not
make enough e⁄ort to remain in the formal markets have a higher expected marginal
utility of consumption. But higher savings also imply a higher propensity to work in
the ￿rst period, which helps understand lemma 2: agents who plan on exerting a less
intensive search for a job choose to work more on informal activities from very early in
their lives. Moreover, as some recent papers in the UI literature show, they will hold
always higher savings.10
The fact that savings are higher o⁄ the equilibrium path will drive some of the
prescriptions found in section 3 to di⁄er from some of the prescriptions found herein.
Educational Policy We begin the discussion with our main concern in this paper:
educational policy. What we show is that the qualitative results regarding educational
policy are not altered by the possibility of hidden savings.
To do this we ￿rst write the ￿rst order necessary condition with respect to h;










￿(p)[p￿ ￿ p] = 0: (10)
The envelope theorem was used in (8) to ￿nd the partial derivative of W with respect
to h:




< ￿0(h + Y ￿):
10This result may not be robust to the introduction of multiple unemployment episodes.
12The inequality above shows that the optimal policy requires the creation of a wedge
between optimal private and social schooling choice, which we formalize in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3 At the optimum, h￿ > ho, where ho ￿ argmaxh W (k;h;ye;Y e;!;p￿).
What the government must induce is a choice of h that is higher than the private
optimum. The rationale is once again that, by forcing agents to get more education, the
government raises the costs of free riding on the unemployment bene￿t program.
Taxation and UI Next, we investigate the consequences of hidden savings for
optimal labor income taxes and the unemployment bene￿ts. To accomplish this we start











































From lemmas 1 and 2, in the appendix, and the expression above, u0(c￿
0) = Eu0(c￿
1),
(expectation is with respect to probability p￿). Then, p < p￿ ) s￿ < s(p): This being





















￿0 (Le)=w(h) ￿ u0(ce(p))
￿
p￿ + p￿ P
p<p￿ ￿(p)
￿ 0:

























The marginal tax rate on labor income ￿(p￿) is proportional to the (implicit) marginal
tax rate on those who deviate by putting less e⁄ort than p￿: The following assumption is
su¢ cient to guarantee that the inequality in (11) is strict, which means that the marginal
tax rate on labor income is negative.
Assumption p: There exists an (arbitrarily small) p > 0 such that ’(p) = 0:
This assumption guarantees that even if one does not make any e⁄ort to ￿nd a job
there is a positive probability that she will ￿nd a job at the legal markets. With this
assumption the following proposition 4￿ which is in contrast with what one would ￿nd
in the setup of section 3￿ obtains.
Proposition 4 Under assumption p, the marginal tax rate on labor income is negative
at the optimum.
What is interesting about this last result is the fact that it was not present in the
case where savings were observed. Nor is it part of any optimal unemployment insur-
ance scheme derived in the literature. One should ￿rst notice that the unemployment
insurance program does not a⁄ect labor supply conditional on one￿ s participation in the
legal markets. This reasoning generates the prescription of zero marginal taxes in the
framework of section 3.
What is new here is the fact that di⁄erences in savings a⁄ect the propensity to work
conditional on one￿ s being in the legal markets. This allows the subsidy on work to
create a disincentive to save that characterize deviating behavior.
This result may not be robust to relaxing the two period formulation. However, the
result would also be valid under the assumption, made by most of the literature, that
once a worker gets a job there is no longer any incentive problem. The crucial point here
is that the possibility of a worker who is employed making some kind of e⁄ort to remain
in this job is neither included in our formulations nor in the standard speci￿cation of the
dynamic problem.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the interaction between unemployment insurance and educa-
tional policy.
In a two period model that subsumes life-long choices agents￿employment status is
a⁄ected by labor market attitude, which, in its own turn is dependent on the relative
cost of being unemployed. Education is important in this world not only because it
14raises the expected income of agents but also because it a⁄ects the opportunity cost of
unemployment. It is this latter e⁄ect that plays the most prominent role in our model.
The main result obtained in the paper is that both unemployment insurance and
educational policies are complementary, i.e., in order to alleviate the moral hazard which
is inherent to UI programs it is always optimal for the government to distort agents
choices toward more investment on human capital, thus increasing opportunity cost of
the unemployment spells.
Another, very interesting ￿nding is that, despite our being in a second best world,
at the optimum, the expected bene￿t of education is equal to its expected cost: a type
of production e¢ ciency result in our setup. This, however, requires the government to
be able to make optimal inter-temporal transfers. The problem is that, as in Roger-
son (1985), optimal policies require the expected marginal utility of consumption to be
higher than marginal utility of consumption in the ￿rst period. This raises all types
of questions about observability of savings and the potential non-convexities that arise
when observability is not assumed.
We deal with non-observable savings and show that encouragement of education is
robust to this modi￿cation in our main setup.
The model is very simplistic and aims only at capturing the interplay between these
two forces. Extending the model to multiple periods is unlikely to change the main
results though it may shed some light on some aspects of the dynamic of human capital
accumulation, and on how this a⁄ects the design of optimal unemployment insurance
contracts.
A Appendix
Lemma 3 At a ￿xed s; ce is decreasing and cu is increasing in transfers.
Proof. For the ￿rst part we just note that ce = Y e + s ￿ !: Since Y e is chosen by
the government, we have dce=d! = ￿1 < 0: For the second, note that cu = Y u + s + ￿!














u00 (cu) ￿ ￿00 (Y u)
￿
> 0:
Lemma 4 c0 is decreasing and cu and ce are increasing in s:
Proof. The proof follow the steps of lemma 3.
Lemma 5 c￿
e ￿ c￿
u in any relaxed program.
15Proof. We will consider the relaxed program and we will prove the lemma by
showing that, if c￿
e < c￿
u; a redistribution of income from the unemployment state to the















+ (1 ￿ p￿)[u(cu) ￿ ￿(Y u)] ￿ ’(p￿)
s.t. ce = ye￿ + s, cu = Y u + s + !, and, c0 = Y ￿
0 ￿ s + k;
(12)
and (c0 (p);ce (p);cu (p);Y0 (p);Yu (p);s(p)) ￿
(







+ (1 ￿ p)[u(cu) ￿ ￿(Y u)] ￿ ’(p￿)
s.t. ce = ye￿ + s, cu = Y u + s + !, and, c0 = Y ￿
0 ￿ s + k
(13)
Since p￿ maximizes the relaxed program we should have, for all p < p￿,
u(c￿
0) ￿ ￿(Y ￿








+ (1 ￿ p￿)[u(c￿
u) ￿ ￿(Y ￿








+ (1 ￿ p)[u(cu(p)) ￿ ￿(Y u(p))] ￿ ’(p) (14)
Now, the fact that choices in (13) are optimal when the probability is p guarantees that
u(c￿
0) ￿ ￿(Y ￿








+ (1 ￿ p)[u(c￿
u) ￿ ￿(Y ￿








+ (1 ￿ p)[u(cu(p)) ￿ ￿(Y u(p))] ￿ ’(p) (15)
From (14) and (15) we have
u(c￿
0) ￿ ￿(Y ￿








+ (1 ￿ p￿)[u(c￿
u) ￿ ￿(Y ￿
u )] ￿ ’(p￿) ￿
u(c￿
0) ￿ ￿(Y ￿








+ (1 ￿ p)[u(c￿
u) ￿ ￿(Y ￿












e)] + ’(p￿) ￿ ’(p); (16)
where ￿p = p￿￿p: Observe that the deviation strategies generally contemplate di⁄erent
choices of s and Y u, as long as c￿
e 6= c￿
u: Notice, however, that, if c￿
e = c￿
u; we have
s(p) = s￿ and Y u(p) = Y ￿
u : Assume that c￿
e < c￿
u: We, now, distribute income from the
unemployment state to the employment until we have c￿
e = c￿
u: This is feasible according
to lemma 3. Denoting ^ Y u the choice made by the truth-telling strategy after the reform,
16we have ^ Y u > Y ￿
u ; (see the proof of lemma 3). We shall prove that the reform does not
violate incentive compatibility, i.e.,
u(^ c￿
0) ￿ ￿(^ Y ￿








+ (1 ￿ p￿)[u(^ c￿
u) ￿ ￿(^ Y ￿
u )] ￿ ’(p￿) ￿ u(^ c0(p))
￿￿(^ Y0(p)) + p
￿





+ (1 ￿ p)[u(^ cu(p)) ￿ ￿(^ Y u(p))] ￿ ’(p) (17)
Because ^ c￿
0 = ^ c0(p), ^ Y ￿
0 = ^ Y0(p), ^ c￿
e = ^ ce
0(p), ^ cu(p) = ^ c￿
u and ^ Y ￿
u = ^ Y u (p); since c￿
e = c￿
u;
after the reform, inequality (17) collapses to
￿p
￿





￿ ’(p￿) ￿ ’(p) (18)
Now, the right hand side of (18) minus the right hand side of (16) is ￿p
R ^ Y u￿
Y ￿
u ￿0(Y )dY > 0
and the left hand side of (16) minus the left hand side of (18) is ￿p[u(c￿
u) ￿ u(c￿
e)] > 0:
Therefore, we conclude that the reform is incentive-compatible and increases welfare,
since the utility is strictly concave.
Proof of lemma 1. Let s￿ and s(p) be as de￿ned in (12) and (13), respectively,
for p < p￿. Assume that s(p) < s￿: (In which case s￿ > 0). From lemma 4, this implies
c0 (s) > c￿
0 which, in turn gives u0 (c0 (p)) < u0 (c￿
0): Now, u0 (c0 (p)) ￿ pu0 (ce (p)) +
(1 ￿ p)u0 (cu (p)) > pu0 (c￿
e)+(1 ￿ p)u0 (c￿
0) > p￿u0 (c￿
e)+(1 ￿ p￿)u0 (c￿
0) = u0 (c￿
0); where
we invoked lemma 4, once again to derive the ￿rst inequality. This is, however, a con-
tradiction.
Proof of lemma 2. We have from lemma 1 that s￿ ￿ s(p) whenever p < p￿: But,
then, by an argument identical to the one used in the proof of lemma 3, one can easily
show the result.
Lemma 6 The resource constraint multiplier, ￿, for the relaxed program, (9), is positive.
Proof. We ￿rst show that Y e = 0 cannot be part of the solution to (9). First note
that when Y e = 0 the government only intervenes in the equilibrium of this economy by
transferring resources across time. It is clear that at Y e = 0 the welfare is lower than
in the competitive equilibrium, when the government plays the same role of transferring
resources. Hence, Y e cannot solve the problem.
Consider, then, the case where solution with respect to Y e is interior. Take the ￿rst

























p<p￿ ￿(p)(1 ￿ p=p￿)
i
> 0:
17Proposition 5 No constraint relative to a strategy that contemplates p > p￿ is binding
at the optimum.
Proof. First solve the relaxed problem and ￿nd the value p￿ that solves (9). If there
is no deviation strategy in which the agent chooses a higher level of e⁄ort and that yields
at least the same utility level as the one associated with p￿, then, we have proved our










^ s; ^ Y ;!;h
￿
+ pV e (^ s;h;ye;Y e) + (1 ￿ p)V u
￿





and let ￿ W ￿ maxp W(p) and ￿ p ￿ max
￿
p;W(p) = ￿ W
￿
: Next, observe that ￿ p(Y e￿ ￿
we￿)￿(1￿ ￿ p)wu￿￿!￿ > p￿(Y e￿￿we￿)￿(1￿p￿)wu￿￿!￿ ￿ 0: Hence, resources are idle,
which implies, from lemma 6, that fwe￿;h￿;wu￿;Y e￿g is not a solution to the ￿ p- relaxed
program. This contradicts the assumption that p￿ belongs in the solution of (9).
Proposition 6 At least one incentive compatibility constraint binds at the optimum.
Proof. Assume the contrary. It is clear that the government must provide full
insurance. Hence, it is obvious that no agent would have any incentive to choose a
positive e⁄ort. Therefore, this policy would not be feasible.
Lemma 7 At the optimum c￿
e > c￿
u.
Proof. Recall the Lagrangian for the government￿ s problem,



























= ￿￿ < 0:
Lemma 8 At the optimum, there is p < p￿ such that s(p) > s(p￿) ￿ 0 and ￿(p) > 0:
18Proof. First, the existence of ￿(p) > 0 is due proposition 6 and the Kuhn-Tucker
theorem. Now, if u0(c￿
0) = Eu0(c￿
1); a slight change in the proof of lemma 5 shows that
is, indeed, the case. So, let us suppose that u0(c￿
0) > Eu0(c￿
1) (consequently s(p￿) = 0)
and that s(p) = 0 for all p < p￿ such that ￿(p) > 0: Hence, it·s obvious that u0(c￿
0) ￿
u0(c0(p)); from lemma 2. From the ￿rst order condition, we have (if s(p) = s(p￿) =
0), u0(c￿
u) = ￿ ￿
P
p<p￿ ￿(p)(p ￿ p￿)u0(c￿
u), and u0(c￿
e) = ￿ ￿
P
p<p￿ ￿(p)(p￿ ￿ p)u0(c￿
e).
Therefore, from the strict concavity of u(￿) we see that c￿
u < c￿
e: Hence, from lemma 1
and the assumption that s(p) = 0 [???] for all p < p￿ with ￿(p) > 0, one can see that
u0(c￿
0) = u0(c0(p)) for all p < p￿ such that ￿(p) > 0: Moreover, from the fact that c￿
u < c￿
e,
it is clear that Eu0(c￿
0) < Eu0 (c0 (p)): We will show that for " > 0 su¢ ciently low, the
policy fwe￿ ￿ ";wu￿ ￿ ";!￿ + "g is welfare-improving and clearly does not violate the























which contradicts the optimality of the policy.
Proof of Proposition 4. From the lemma 8, there is p < p￿ such that s(p) >
s(p￿) ￿ 0 and ￿(p) > 0: From the Spence-Mirrlees condition it is clear that s(p) >
s(p￿) ) ￿(p￿) < ￿(p): Now, if the left hand side of (11) is zero, the right hand side is
negative. Therefore, the marginal tax rate can not be zero.










The right hand side is less than the left hand side, hence this can not be the case.
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